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Health care
advance
directives:
the next
generation
By Prof. Linda S. Whitton
On july 1, 1994, Indiana joined the
majority of states that permit their citizens to declare in advance of incurable illness or injury what their preferences concerning artificially supplied
nutrition and hydration would be in
the event they cannot communicate
those desires at the time of treatment. l
Although these statutory amendments
have provided a degree of flexibility
previously missing under Indiana law,
numerous unresolved statutory ambiguities and inadequacies continue to
challenge Indiana practitioners who
counsel clients on the use of health
care advance directives.

capacity to give or withhold contemporaneous consent.

able health care powers, is separately
codified under Article 5 ofTitle 30.5

The second type, health care proxy
and durable powers statutes, permits
delegation of health care decision-making authority to a representative or
agent conditioned upon the delegating
individual's loss of capacity to act on
his or her own behalf.

Although it might be argued that a
person who has qualified relatives
under the family consent statute need
not execute an advance health care
directive, certain aspects of the family
consent provisions should be considered before placing full reliance on
default decision-making.

The third form of surrogate decisionmaking legislation, often known as
family consent laws, is a default mechanism that gives health care decisionmaking authority to specified relatives
of an individual who is incapable of
giving consent and did not previously
appoint a surrogate.
Indiana has provided for all three
types of surrogate decision-making
through independent legislative enactments. The Living Wills and LifeProlonging Procedures Act, which provides for directed decision-making/
and the Health Care Consent Act,
which provides for both delegated decision-making through appointment of
a health care representative 3 and
default authority for health care consent by family members,4 appear, as
recodified, under Article 36 of Indiana
Code Title 16. The Indiana Power of
Attorney Act, which authorizes dur-

The purpose of this article is to highlight common trouble areas in the
drafting and implementation of health
care directives and to assess the status
of Indiana law in relationship to national developments in advance directive
legislation.

Directed, delegated and default
decision-making
Three primary classifications of legislation for health care surrogate decision-making have developed in this
country. The first, commonly known as
living will legislation, provides for
directed decision-making by empowering individuals to declare in advance
how they would like certain treatment
decisions made if they later lose the
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Indiana's statute provides that health
care consent may be given by a
spouse, parent, adult child o r adult sibling,6 but gives no clear order of priority in the event that more than one
family member is available to give consent or there is a disagreement among
qualified decision-makers. Furthermore, no provision is made for individuals who lack relatives of the degree
specified by statute, or who are unmarried but live in non-traditional domestic partnerships.
A final concern with default decisionmaking is the scope of authority afforded family members . The Supreme
Court of Indiana: has interpreted this
scope to include decisions regarding
artificial nutrition and hyd ration/
which may be broader than what an
individual would have chosen if able
to appoint a health care representative
via an advance directive.
Other states have tried a variety of
legislative approaches to deal with the
unsatisfactory aspects of family consent statutes. These include setting a
clear order of priority for default surrogate decision-makers,B as we ll as
addressing disputes among classes of
decision-makers, such as adult children
or siblings, by requiring a majority9 or
consensuslO decision. In the absence
of consensus, the decision may then
be referred to an ethics committee,,,
or the dissenting surrogate decisionmakers may pursue guardianship proceedings.12
Some states even provide for default
surrogate decision-making by a "close
friend" of the patient when higher-pri-
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ority family members are not
available.13 All of these approaches are
attempts at balancing the obvious benefits of a flexible default health care
consent mechanism with the need for
safeguards of the significant interests
at stake.

Coordinating three statutes
and documents
Probably the best planning strategy
for an individual who fears the uncertainty of default provisions is careful
delegation of health care authority to
selected agents, and coordination of
this delegation with a living will or lifeprolonging procedures declaration. A
written health care directive is advantageous because it can delegate priority
decision-making authority to non-relatives if preferred, and even when the
preferred agents are family members,
it can establish an order of priority
among decision-makers as well as
delineate the desired scope of authority. A health care advance directive can

also be used to disqualify relatives who
could otherwise give health care consent in a default situation.14
While delegating health care authority via a written directive would be
preferable to relying on default provisions for most individuals, the intricacies of Indiana advance directive
statutes may hinder the lay public's
access to effective directives without
the assistance of counsel. For example,
a matter of confusion for both clients
and practitioners is the distinction
between appointment of a health care
representative under Indiana Code
§16-36-1 -7 and delegation of durable
health care powers to an attorney-infact under Indiana Code §§30-5-5-16
and -1 7. Review of these statutes
reveals that the powers under each are
not coextensive.
Indiana's current Power of Attorney
Act was enacted subsequent to the
provisions of the Health Care Consent

Act and contemplates that a principal
must properly execute and attach to a
health care power of attorney the
appointment of a health care representative if the attorney-in-fact is to have
authority to consent to or refuse health
care on the principal's behalf.15
Furthermore, specific statutory language contained in Indiana Code §305-5-1 7 must be included in the
appointment to convey authority to
withdraw or withhold "health care,"
which under the Power of Attorney
Act is defined to include "the providing of nutrition and hydration through
intravenous, endotracheal or nasogastric tubes."16
Powers which may be conveyed
through the power of attorney, independent of the appointment of a
health care representative, include:
employing or contracting with ser(continued on page 20)
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Advance directives
continued from page 19
vants, companions or health care
providers for the principal; admitting
or releasing the principal from a hospital or health care facility; having access
to medical records; making anatomical
gifts; requesting an autopsy; and making plans for disposition of the principal's body.17
Thus, to achieve maximum flexibility
and protection against guardianship, as
well as the broadest surrogate health
care authority allowed by law, the
client needs both a health care representative appointment and a health
care durable power of attorney.
Although the health care powers
under the Health Care Consent Act
and the Power of Attorney Act are not
coextensive, the drafter of a durable
power of attorney with accompanying
health care representative appointment must be careful that both documents contain parallel provisions with
respect to who is designated as the
agent under each.
The Power of Attorney Act specifically provides for appointment of a successor attorney-in-fact,1B but the

Health Care Consent Act is silent on
the issue of successors. Since one of
the major reasons for executing
advance directives is as a hedge
against guardianship, prudent planning
would suggest that a health care
durable power of attorney name at
least one successor attorney-in-fact,
and that such appointment be paralleled by a successor health care representative.
Not only should the provisions of the
health care representative appointment be carefully coordinated with
those of the health care durable power
of attorney, but potential conflicts with
any statement of directed decisionmaking - i.e., a living will or life-prolonging procedures declaration should also be assessed.
An unanswered question under
Indiana law is whether a living will or
life-prolongin g procedures declaration
limits or pre-empts the authority of a
health care representative who has
been given the power to withdraw or
withhold health care pursuant to the
specified statutory language in Indiana
Code §30-5-5-1 7. Consider the potential dilemma for a health care provider
if presented with both a life-prolonging
procedures declaration and a valid

health care representative appointment containing the authority to withdraw or withhold health care.
The most recent amendments to the
living will declaration make a limited
attempt at avoiding this type of conflict by giving declarants the following
choices concerning artificial nutrition
and hydration:
_ I w ish to receive artificially supplied
nutrition and hydration, even if the effort
to sustain life is futile or excessively burdensome to me.
_ I do not wish to receive artificially
supplied nutrition and hydration, if the
effort to sustain life is futile or excessively
burdensome to me.
_ I intentionally make no decision concerning artificially supplied nutrition and
hydration, leaving the decision to my
health care representative appointed
under I.C. 16-36-1-7 or my attorney-in-fact
with health care powers under I.C. 30-55.19

Of course these choices do not
cover other life-prolonging procedures,
nor do they address the situation of a
client who wishes to express a preference regarding artificial nutrition and
hydration in the event the health care
representative is unavailable to act, but
who in no way wishes to fetter the representative's discretion to use his or
her best judgment in unfo reseen situations.
The only solution at present to these
potential conflicts is to include a statement in the client's advance directive
documents that clearly establishes or
precludes any limiting effect of a living
will or life-prolonging procedures declaration on delegation of health care
authority to a representative or attorney-in-fact.
Probl e ms like the foregoing have
prompted a number of states to
replace piecemeal advance directive
legislation with unified acts aimed at
recognizing a single legal instrument to
address both directed decision-making
and delegation of surrogate health
care authority.20 The National Confer-
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ence of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law has also adopted a comprehensive model act known as the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act.21
However, absent clarifying legislation
in In diana, practitioners are left the
uneasy task of reconciling three separate legislative acts, three documents,
and a host of statutory ambiguities in
order to translate a client's wishes into
a comprehensive plan for directed and
delegated health care decision-making.
Although none of the advance directive statutes in Indiana requires document preparation by legal counsel, as
a practical matter the statutory scheme
is antithetical to layperson-fri e ndly
applications.
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Access and implementation
Access to advance directives is a particularly significant concern given the
context in which the need usually arises. When illness, injury or impendi ng
surgery precipitates the need for a
health care directive, the person
requiring treatment may not be able to
visit an attorney's office or wait several
days for document preparation.
Notwithstanding th e requirement of
The Patient Self-Determination Act of
199022 that all Medicare and Medicaid
provider organizations inform patients
of their respective state-law rights to
formulate advance directives, hospital
admissions personnel are usually not
legally trained to explain the nuances
of Indiana's health care directive laws.
Hospitals may have fill-in -the-blank
health ca re directive forms that patients can execute upon admission,
but often these forms are outdated or
offer less than the full range of legally
available options for health care deciion-making.23 Whether due to the difiiculty of access or the emotionall y
unappealing nature of the task, it has
been estimated that only 15 percent of
mericans have executed any sort of
Hitten health care directive.24
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Advance directives
continued from page 21

Even for individuals who have executed well-prepared advance directives,
there are a number of impediments to
effective implementation. One is
notice to the appropriate health care
providers that such documents exist.
This is especially problematic in situations of emergency hospital admissions. Hospitals may refuse to accept
advance directives from an individual
prior to an actual admission for treatment, and a patient admitted on an
emergency basis may be unconscious
or in no condition to locate copies of
the directives before being taken to
the hospitai. 2S To date, no workable
central repository for health care directives has been established. However,
several states have amended their driver's license statutes to provide notice
of advance directives.26
Another difficulty with implementation of valid health care directives is
varying hospital policies regarding the
withdrawal or withholding of life-prolonging procedures, especially artificial
nutrition and hydration. Indiana law
provides that an attending physician
may refuse to honor a patient's living
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will or life-prolonging procedures declaration, but must attempt to transfer
the patient to another physician who
will honor the declaration.27
Because decisions to withdraw or
withhold life-prolon gi ng procedures
usually occur in a hospital setting, the
physician's willingness to honor an
advance directive may be determined
by hospital policy. Federal law requires
that Medicaid and Medicare provider
o rganizations not only provide written
information to adult individuals about
their state-law rights to formulate
advance directives, but that the organization also provide written information
about the organizatio n's policies
respectin g implementation of such
rights. 28
Unfortunately this does not always
happen in practice, or if in fact such
written information is provided, a
patient or the patient's health care representative may not understand the full
import of the information until treatment such as artificial nutrition and
hydration becomes an issue. In these
situations, a patient may be subjected
to unwanted life-prolonging procedures pending transfer to a facility that
will honor the advance directive.
A similar problem may occur with
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respect to emergency medical services
(EMS) person nel and advance direct ives. Absent legislation permitting
EMS to fo llo w advance directives
requestin g no resuscitation, EMS personnel are required to administer lifesaving treatment.29 Indiana has yet to
address this problem legislatively, but
20 other states now have "non-hospital, do-not-resuscitate" laws that apply
to emergency medical services.3D For a
terminally ill patient, unwanted intervention by emergency medical personnel could create exactly the scenario
that an advance directive was executed to avoid - that of placing the
patient's family in the position of having to request the removal of life support systems.

Conclusion
In some respects Indiana has been a
forerunner in the field of advance
directives, enacting le gislation for
directed, delegated and default surrogate decision-making. However, experience with attempting to coordinate
these separately enacted laws into a
comprehensive scheme for health care
planning has revealed numerous problems and pitfalls. States nationwide are
beginning to reassess their advance
directive and family consent laws in
order to make them more accessible
and responsive to the needs of their
citizenry. Perhaps it is time for Indiana
to join these efforts to develop the
next generation of health care advance
directives.
1. The 108th General Assembly approved Pub.
L. No. 99-1994 on March 18, 1994, which
amended Ind. Code §§16-36-4-1 , 16-36-4-10
and 16-36-4-13 effective July 1, 1994. Other
jurisdictions that explicitly permit advance
directives regarding the use of artificially supplied nutrition and hydration include Alaska,
Arizona , California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
2. Ind. Code §§16-36-4-1 to -21 (Supp. 1994).
3. Ind. Code §16-36-1-7 (Supp. 1994).
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4. Ind. Code §16-36-1-5(a)(2) (Supp. 1994).
5. Ind. Code §§30-5-1-1 to 30-5-10-4 (1 994).
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6. Ind. Code §16-36-1-5(a)(2) (Supp. 1994).
7. See In re Lawrence, 579 N.E.2d 32 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §36-3231(A)
(1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. §765.401(1) (West Supp.
1995); 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 40/25(a) (1992); Md.
Health-Gen. Code Ann. §5-605(a)(2) (1994).
9. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §36-3231(A)(2)
(1993); Fla. Stat. Ann. §765.401(1)(c), (e) (West
Supp. 1995).
10. See, e.g., 755111. Comp. Stat. 40/25(a) (1992).
11. See, e.g., Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann. §5605(b) (1994).
12. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. §15-18.5-103(4)
(Supp. 1994); 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 40/25 (d)
(1992).
13. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §36-3231(A)(6)
(1993) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. §15-18.5-103(3) (Supp.
1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. §765.401(1)(g) (West
Supp. 1995); 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. 40/25(a)(7)
(1992) ; Md. Health-Gen. Code Ann . §5605(a)(2)(vi) (1994).
14. Ind. Code §16-36-1-9 (Supp. 1994).
15. Ind. Code §30-5-5-16(b)(2) (1994).
16. Ind. Code §30-5-2-4 (1994).
17. Ind. Code §30-5-5-16(b) (1994).
18. Ind. Code §30-5-4-4(c) (1994).
19. Ind. Code §16-36-4-10 (Supp. 1994).
20. See Charles Sabatino et al. , Legislative
Developments in Advance Directive & Family
Consent Law, 1994 ABA Joint Conference on
Law & Aging 235, 236; see, e.g., Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§36-3201 to -3262 (1993) ; Md.
Health-Gen. Code Ann. §§5-601 to -618 (1994
& Supp. 1994); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§26:2H-53 to78 (West Supp. 1994).
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21 . 9 U.L.A. 94 (Supp. 1994).
22. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§4206, 4751 , 104 Stat.
1388 (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
23. For the past four years the author has supervised a pro bono program to provide advance
directives to senior citizens and clients of the
AIDS Care Coordination Program in Porter
and Lake counties. The observations concerning hospital-provided advance directive
forms are based on numerous sample documents brought by pro bono clients to their Initial in-take interviews.
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25. One of the author's pro bono clients, a cardiac patient, relayed an account of the hospital refusing his request to place his advance
directives on file because he was not presently admitted to the hospital, although he had
been a patient on numerous occasions ,
including emergency admissions.
26. See, e.g., 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. §5/6-11 O(g)
(1992) ; Minn. Stat. Ann . §171 .07(7) (West
Supp. 1995); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §32-1217 (Supp. 1994); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art.
6687b(110) (West Supp. 1995).
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o the r workers in t h e con stru c tion tra d es for con stru ction
site injury claims. For more information or t o discu ss
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R ex Baker at (31 7 ) 269-35 5 0 or (800) 269-3443.

27. Ind. Code §16-36-4-13(e) (Supp. 1994).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§1395cc(f) (1992), 1396a(w) (Supp.
1994).
29. See Sabatino et al., supra note 20, at 237.
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30. /d.; see, e.g, Alaska Stat. §§18.12.01 0-.100
(1994) ; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §36-3251 (1993);
N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§2960-2979 (McKinney
1993 & Supp. 1995).
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